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IntroductIon
 
The defeat of the Chinese Nationalist Party 
(Guomindang) in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, and the 
demise of the Nationalist state on the Chinese mainland 
are often explained as a consequence of the incompetence, 
mismanagement and corruption of Nationalist governance. 
In this approach, fiscal incompetence is understood as but 
one manifestation of the low effectiveness of Nationalist 
governance, and the Guomindang’s efforts to redesign the 
Chinese tax system during the Nanjing decade (1928-1937) 
are associated with rapacious revenue extraction.1 And yet 
central government revenue increased on an annual basis 
for most of this period, indicating that the extraction level 
of Nationalist fiscal policy was sustainable (see table 1). 
1 E.g. Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China under 
Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1974): 228-230.
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Table 1, National Government Receipts, Fiscal Years 
1929-19372 (million yuan)
During the period under review, Customs revenue 
constituted the single greatest share of central government 
revenue (see table 2). Nationalist tariff policy, therefore, 
constitutes a good test of pessimistic interpretations of 
Guomindang fiscal policy. If the burden of Nationalist 
tariff policy had been unsustainable, we would expect to 
see evidence of China’s international trade having ground 
to a halt by the end of this period. Instead, that trade was 
in a robust condition just before the Japanese invasion of 
China proper in July 1937, as this extract from the British 
Embassy’s country report for 1937 demonstrates:
Had it not been for the hostilities, the trade figures 
for 1937 might well have approached those of the 
previous record year of 1931, before the world 
depression had begun to affect this country. By the 
end of July [1937], imports had gained 36.7 per cent 
and exports 45.5 per cent [on the previous year’s 
figures]. In fact, in the summer of 
2 Julia Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: State Build-
ing in Republican China, 1927-1940 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998): 120.
1937, China’s foreign trade was for the first time 
showing that it had almost completely recovered 
from the financial crisis of 1934-1935, which was 
caused largely by the exodus of silver owing to the 
high price of metal abroad.3
That international trade grew during a period of 
increasing tax burden suggests that the story of Nationalist 
fiscal policy during this period is more complicated than is 
suggested by the work cited above. This article will use the 
example of tariff policy to argue that during the Nanjing 
decade, the Nationalist Government consciously pursued 
fiscal stability through increased revenue extraction. Over 
the decade, Nationalist government central government 
revenue saw an overall increase as well diversification. 
Customs revenue more than doubled between 1929 and 
1937. At the same time, the relative share of Customs 
3 “Annual Report on China for 1937,” in Sir A. Clark Kerr to 
Viscount Halifax, (29th April, 1938) [F6312/6312/10], in British 
Documents on Foreign Affairs (hereafter BDFA), Part II, Series 
E, Asia, 1914-1939, Vol. 21, China, 1932-1939, edited by K. 
Bourne, D. Cameron Watt, and A. Trotter, (Fredericksburg, Mary-
land: University Publications of America, 1992): 372-73.
I am grateful to Iacob Koch-Weser for commissioning this article, to Andrea Revelant for inviting me to present an 
earlier version of this article at a workshop on “State and Society in East Asia, 1910-45: Comparative Perspectives 
on Political, Financial and Legal Issues” at the Università Ca’ Foscari, Venezia, to Renzo Cavalieri, Anthony Dicks, 
Andrea Revelant, Jan Schmidt and Valeria Zanier for questions and comments at the conference, and to Patricia 
Hayward for her kind permission to quote from her father’s unpublished papers. Much of the research for this ar-
ticle was originally conducted for my PhD thesis, supervised by Hans van de Ven at the University of Cambridge 
and funded by the Arts & Humanities Research Council award APN 16,296 ‘The History of the Chinese Maritime 
Customs Service, 1854-1949’. My research this year was funded by an An Wang Postdoctoral Fellowship at the 
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University. Madeline Graham kindly prepared the figures, based on 
data provided by me.
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revenue among tax revenue dropped from 72.8 percent to 
49.5 percent. 
Despite this ostensible success, fiscal stability 
came at the cost of a loss of political capital. As I will 
show in this article with reference to imported sugar, 
increased import tariffs drove many Chinese consumers 
to consume smuggled sugar instead of paying a higher 
price for heavily taxed imported sugar. Increased import 
tariffs gave the Nationalist Government the ability to 
meet its foreign financial obligations and to finance rising 
central government expenditure in the 1930s. And yet, 
their unintended consequence was a dramatic increase 
in smuggling which, by its widespread and visible 
nature disproved the Nationalist Government’s claims to 
administrative modernity and efficiency.
Table 2, National Government Tax Receipts, Fiscal Years 
1929-19374
whIch natIonalIst Government?
 There is not much doubt that the overall tax 
burden on Chinese consumers during the decade 1928-
1937 was heavy as well as frequently unpredictable. It is 
important, in this context, to distinguish between taxes 
levied by the Nationalist Government in Nanjing and 
those levied by branch organizations of the Nationalist 
party-state in the provinces. The central government’s 
hold on these was tenuous, at best. Indeed, there is a 
conceptual question here: whom do we mean when we 
speak of Nationalist fiscal policy? Is it disingenuous, 
when discussing Guomindang fiscal policy, to focus on 
the policies of the central party-state in Nanjing when 
we know fully well that for many Chinese at the time, 
Nanjing mattered much less than did their local power-
holder, even in areas under the Nationalist Government’s 
jurisdiction? I would argue that it is not, since, when we 
speak of the Nationalist Government, it is of the central 
party-state in Nanjing that we think first. 
 We do, however, need to be precise in defining 
4 Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, 124.
what part of the Nationalist polity we are discussing. 
Joseph Esherick’s caveat against understanding the 
Chinese Communist party-state as a “unified, disciplined 
historical agent” applies in equal measure to writing the 
history of the Nationalist party-state.5 With that mind, this 
article is an investigation into the effect of the tariff policy 
of the central party-state in Nanjing on the development 
of China’s trade in imported sugar.  
natIonalIst tarIff PolIcy
Nationalist tariff policy was primarily oriented 
towards producing central government revenue. In 
the course of achieving this aim, it created patterns of 
consumption that privileged some domestic consumers 
and producers at the cost of others. Eastman and others 
have pointed out that peasants bore a heavy weight of 
taxation as a result of the land tax and the salt monopoly.6 
My research suggests that Chinese consumers in general 
also bore the brunt of increases in commercial taxation, 
particularly on articles such as sugar, cotton, kerosene and 
artificial fertilizer. Protectionist tariff policy was attempted 
where it was fiscally and politically possible; government 
efforts to shape consumption according to its own vision 
were substantially constrained by external factors, such as 
Japanese political, military and economic aggression, and 
revenue considerations. 
The Republic of China’s first tariff after regaining 
tariff autonomy was promulgated on December 7, 1928 
and implemented from February 1, 1929. Figure 1 shows 
the values of import tariffs as a percentage of total import 
values. This figure, which is the average of import tariffs in 
percent, is an indicator of the heaviness of import tariffs. 
The first column shows the values arrived at by Frank 
Kai-Ming Su and Alvin Barber in 1936. Su and Barber 
do not explain their choice of totals for import value and 
5 Joseph Esherick. “Ten theses on the Chinese Revolution.” Mod-
ern China 21, no.1 (1995): 63.
6 Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, 205-208.
1929-19374 (million yuan)
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import tariff value.7 Recalculating their indicator with the 
respective values provided in Hsiao Liang-lin’s statistical 
compilation, I have arrived at values that are only slightly 
different for all years except 1931 and 1933.8 Both sets of 
indicators show that beginning from 1929, the year of 
tariff autonomy, China’s imports were taxed increasingly 
heavily until the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in 
1937; from 1939 onwards, imports were taxed more lightly 
once more. 
Through increased import tariffs, the Nationalist 
Government sought to achieve two objectives: firstly, 
to increase its revenue; and secondly, to extend tariff 
protection to Chinese economic interests. In order to 
understand why those twin objectives were frequently at 
variance with one another, it is necessary for us to consider 
briefly a concept of the economics of taxation, the Laffer 
curve. From a government’s point of view, the optimum 
rate of taxation is the highest point of a bell curve; lowering 
or raising the rate of taxation will lead to lower taxation 
revenue. Although the Laffer curve was popularized in 
the 1970s, the inverse relationship between tax rate and 
tax revenue beyond a certain point was known long 
before. Frederick Maze, then Commissioner of Customs 
in Shanghai, warned the Nationalist Government in 1927 
against raising tonnage dues, pointing out that increasing 
the cost of landing goods at Shanghai would drive 
importers to land their goods elsewhere instead. Maze 
warned Song Ziwen that according to a Western proverb, 
it was “unwise to strangle the goose that lays golden eggs”.9 
7 Frank Kai-Ming Su and Alvin Barber. “China’s Tariff Auton-
omy: Fact or Myth?” Far Eastern Survey 5, no.12 (1936): 115-
122.
8 Hsiao Liang-lin. China’s Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864-1949 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University East Asia Research Center, 
1974): 24, 133.
9 National Archives: Public Record Office FO 371/12414 Freder-
ick Maze, ‘Remarks on Imposition of Surtax on Tonnage’ (Trans-
lation),  July 23, 1927, in Sir Sidney Barton to Sir Miles Lamp-
son, no. 43, July 28, 1927. 
 At the same time, the optimum rate of import 
taxation from a protectionist point of view is not the 
highest point on a Bell curve; rather, it is as high a rate as is 
politically possible. From a protectionist point of view, the 
less foreign competition for domestic goods, the better. This 
objective is best achieved through high rates of taxation; 
hence the People’s Republic of China’s import tax of over 
100 percent on imported cars until recently10 (abolished 
under WTO harmonization procedures), or the 70 percent 
rate on “lace trimmings, embroideries, plushes, velvets, 
silk piece goods, natural and artificial”, in the 1929 tariff.11 
These high rates, besides protectionist considerations, were 
also influenced by revenue considerations and prescriptive 
visions about Chinese consumption.
Given the basic contradiction between revenue 
considerations and protectionist considerations, how did 
the GMD use the tariff schedule to further their political 
aims? At the time that the first autonomous tariff was 
implemented in 1929, the Government announced that it 
would use its newly gained tariff autonomy not only to 
increase tariff revenue, but also to protect and further the 
growth of domestic industries. Subsequent tariff schedules 
until 1938 were affected by this basic contradiction, with 
the international repercussions of tariff changes forming 
another important factor affecting tariff policy. 
the case of suGar 
 The trade in imported sugar offers an opportunity 
to examine the effect of Nationalist tariff policy on the trade 
in one specific commodity. In Republican China, sugar 
was a necessity, used both as a spice and as a preservative 
in the preparation of food. By the early twentieth century, 
Chinese consumers had acquired a taste for refined sugar 
in preference to raw sugar. Refined sugar thus became one 
of the most important imported goods; as such, it attracted 
steadily increasing import tariffs, which significantly 
reduced the importation of sugar throughout the 1930s. 
Domestic consumers were driven either to revert to 
using domestically produced raw sugar, or to purchase 
smuggled refined sugar. In this way, refined sugar became 
the commodity most widely smuggled into China in the 
1930s.12 
 After regaining tariff autonomy, import tariffs on 
sugar were increased in four main steps, which became 
effective in 1929, 1931, 1933 and 1934 respectively. Taking 
refined sugar as an example, import tariff rates increased 
from Customs Gold Units (hereafter CGU) 0.019/kg in 
1929 to CGU 0.047/kg in 1931 and CGU 0.096/kg in 1933. 
10 People’s Republic of China, “1999 Tariff Law“, accessed on 
November 22, 2007, www.chinavista.com/database/cides.  
11 “Customs Import Tariff of the Republic of China.” In China 
Yearbook, 1929-1930 (Tianjin: Tientsin Press Ltd., 1929): 238-
66. 
12 Haldore Hansen, “Soldier, Smuggler and Diplomat.” Pacific 
Affairs 9, no.4 (1936): 544-56; Burke Inlow. “Japan’s ‘Special 
Trade’ in North China, 1935-1937.” Far Eastern Quarterly 6, 
no.2 (1947): 139-67.
Figure 2.3:  Value of Import Tariffs as 
Percentage of total Import Value
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Figure 1: Value of Import Tariffs as 
Percentage of Total Import Value
17 HARVARD ASIA qUARTERLY  |  20th Century Perspectives 20th Century Perspectives  |   HARVARD ASIA qUARTERLY               18
For the purpose of comparison, I have converted the 1928 
figure from Haiguan Taels into CGU at the 1930 exchange 
rate, the CGU only having been introduced in 1930.13  Also, 
I have converted piculs into kilograms.14 Again converted 
at 1930 exchange rates, the 1928 import tariff is equivalent 
to 0.70 US$/ kg, the 1930 rate to 1.90 US$/kg and the 1933 
rate to 3.84 US$/kg. 
 In 1931, the Customs changed their method 
of classifying sugar for valuation purposes from using 
the Dutch Sugar Standard, a visual examining aid, to 
measuring the polarization of sugar dissolved in water, 
a chemical procedure. This change led to a much more 
differentiated import tariff scale for sugar. While I have no 
disaggregated figures for different kinds of sugar, figure 2 
shows the trend in volume and value of imported sugar for 
the period under consideration. To ensure the statistical 
uniformity of my tables and graphs I have converted post-
1933 figures from National Dollars into Haiguan Taels. 
Fig 2: Quantity and Value of Sugar Imported15
Figure 2 shows clearly the effect of increased tariffs 
on imported sugar; sugar importation peaked in terms 
of both value and quantity just before tariff autonomy, 
as merchants were buying speculatively in expectation 
of a tariff increase following China’s regaining of tariff 
autonomy. The tariff increases of 1929 and 1931 reversed 
this speculative trend. In 1932, sugar imports for the 
whole country fell because of price agreements among 
the international sugar cartels; in the International Sugar 
Convention of 9th May 1931, eight sugar-producing 
13 1 Haiguan Tael = 1.55 National Dollars, SHAC 679/1/26912 IG 
Circular 2nd Series No 4588, March 1933. 
14 1 picul = 60.48 kilograms, Hong Kong SAR Government, 
“Weights and Measures Ordinance”, June 30, 1997. See www.
legislative.gov.hk. 
15 Hsiao Liang-lin, China’s Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864-1949 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974): 68.
countries accounting for 60 percent of sugar exports 
agreed to limit exports in the interest of preserving price 
stability on the international sugar market.16  Sugar trade 
was also disrupted by the Japanese attack on Shanghai, 
while purchasing power was diminished because of the 
1931 floods.17 
In 1933, Chinese consumers began to feel the effect 
of import duties assessed on polarization basis rather than 
on the basis of the Dutch Sugar Standard (see above). The 
increased import duty “priced imported sugar out of the 
range of most consumers”.18 As a result, both the smuggling 
of foreign sugar into China and the domestic cane sugar 
industry experienced a period of growth. In 1934, import 
tariffs averaging 222.25 percent of the c.i.f. (i.e. cost, 
insurance, freight) price of imported sugar contributed to 
a continued increase of smuggling. Ding Guitang (丁贵堂), 
a senior official in the Chinese Maritime Customs Service 
reported from Guangdong in 1934 that “the present import 
tariff on sugar is so high and the 
market price of sugar so low that 
no legitimate trade in sugar can 
exist”.19 
The Maritime Customs 
Service claimed to have asserted 
some control in Hebei and 
Shandong Provinces and forced 
imported sugar back on the 
legal market. Overall, there 
was a decline in imported sugar 
because of the depressed state 
of China’s domestic economy.20 
The currency reform of 1935 
increased the purchasing power 
of Chinese consumers abroad 
and led to a slight increase 
of sugar imports, particularly 
from Japan and Taiwan. At 
the same time, the Nationalist 
Government attempted to develop the domestic sugar 
industry.21 In 1936, international suppliers of sugar lowered 
their wholesale price in order to recover the China market, 
but even so, markets remained depressed, particularly 
because importers did not have sufficient confidence in 
the market to make forward purchases of imported sugar.22 
16 Horacio Crespo. “Trade Regimes and the International Sugar 
Market, 1850-1980: Protectionism, Subsidies and Regulation.” 
In From Silver to Cocaine: Latin American Commodity Chains 
and the Building of the World Economy, 1500-2000, edited by 
Stephen Topik, Carlos Marichal and Zephyr L. Frank (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2006): 163.
17 Trade of China 1932, Vol.1, 50.
18 Trade of China, 1933, Vol.1, 46.
19 Second Historical Archives of China (hereafter SHAC) 
679/14715 K.T. Ting to IG of Customs, Special No 1304, January 
30, 1934.
20 Trade of China, 1934, Vol.1, 52.
21 Trade of China, 1935, Vol.1, 58.
22 Trade of China, 1936, Vol.1, 69.
Quantity and Value of Sugar Imported
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
19
25
19
26
19
27
19
28
19
29
19
30
19
31
19
32
19
33
19
34
19
35
19
36
19
37
19
38
19
39
19
40
Year
Q
u
an
ti
ty
 i
n
 t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
 P
ic
u
ls
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
Quantity
Value
V
al
u
e 
in
 t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s 
H
ai
g
u
an
 T
ae
ls
Indicates 
 tariff 
increase
17 HARVARD ASIA qUARTERLY  |  20th Century Perspectives 20th Century Perspectives  |   HARVARD ASIA qUARTERLY               18
In keeping with the overall trend of import trade and 
economic development, the import sugar trade increased 
in 1937 until the Japanese invasion of the North China 
Plain and renewed attack on Shanghai. After the outbreak 
of hostilities, sugar imports declined rapidly.
In sum, increased import tariffs in 1929, 1931 and 
1934 caused a significant decline in both quantity and 
value of imported sugar. The effect of rising tariff rates in 
driving up the price of imported sugar was compounded 
by the supply policy of foreign sugar cartels in the early 
1930s. Furthermore, sugar was smuggled into China both 
from Taiwan and, after 1931, from the Japanese-controlled 
Manchurian provinces as part of measures to destabilize 
the Chinese economy. Sugar imports increased again 
after 1937, when tariffs on imported sugar were lowered 
in Japanese-controlled areas and the Japanese Military 
Authorities curbed smuggling.
smuGGlInG as a consequence of natIonalIst 
tarIff PolIcy
 Increased Customs revenue and the growth 
of native industries such as the sugar industry were an 
intended result of Nationalist tariff policy. Smuggling was 
not. In 1930s China, smuggling chiefly occurred in three 
areas: the Pearl River Delta (from Hong Kong and Macao), 
the Fujian coastline (from Taiwan), and in North China. 
After the Japanese annexation of Manchuria in 1931, 
the smuggling in this region moved to the border region 
between Fengtian Province and the northernmost part 
of China proper, Zhili Province.23 An unsigned Customs 
memorandum from 1933 noted:
Sugar is smuggled wholesale: the only sugar which 
pays duty in Hainan is sugar which has been seized by 
the Customs. Smuggled sugar comes mostly from the 
Straits and Java by junk and from Kwangchowwan. 
Sugar is shipped in large quantities from Hongkong 
to Kwangchowwan and Macao by steamers over 
which we have no control, and thence distributed 
by junks, snake boats, carriers and by any means of 
conveyance throughout Kwangtung: the quantities 
thus smuggled cannot be estimated since Hongkong 
Trade Statistics are very incomplete, the cargoes 
of many small steamers, junks, etc, being listed as 
sundries. Formosa is a great smuggling run for sugar; 
the greater part of the sugar is shipped by Japanese 
steamers from Java for Formosan ports in transit 
[…]. […] Nearly 4,000 tons were so shipped by three 
Japanese steamers between 20th November and 31st 
December, 1932. Sugar is distributed from Formosa 
to various parts of the Fukien and Chekiang coasts 
by “puff-puff” boats and junks. The latter frequently 
load from steamers outside Formosan port limits. 
We are seizing huge quantities of this sugar and have 
23  Now Liaoning and Hebei Provinces.
even forced some legitimate imports into Amoy and 
Foochow, but smuggling continues. Sugar leaves 
Dairen in junk loads and “puff-puff” boat loads for 
the Shantung and Kiangsu coasts; smuggling has 
increased by leaps and bounds since we lost control 
at Dairen.24
Customs records show that smuggling from occupied 
Manchuria into the North China Plain was tolerated and 
protected by the Japanese Military Authorities. Whether 
they also encouraged it is more difficult to establish; not 
least because, from the 1920s onwards, the Guandong 
Army25 had a foreign policy agenda quite different from 
that of successive imperial governments in Tokyo. The 
most direct admission of Japanese unwillingness to curb 
smuggling from the Japanese client state of Manchukuo 
(created in 1932) into the North China Plain was made by 
a Japanese official identified only by his surname, Sumi, 
to the British Commercial Counselor in Tokyo in April 
1936. Sumi stated that “he had for some time been pressing 
the [Nanjing] Government to reduce tariffs, but without 
success; […] meanwhile, Japan could not agree to assist in 
suppressing smuggling”.26
However, smuggling into the North China Plain did 
not begin only with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. 
In August 1931, Luigi de Luca, the Tianjin Commissioner, 
wrote to the Inspector General that “the cheapness on the 
Tientsin market of Japanese Sugar and the fact that there 
[appeared] to be larger stocks of this commodity than the 
Customs Returns [could] account for” had induced him to 
suspect “that along the coast of the Gulf of Pohai there must 
be places were smuggling can easily be effected”.27 After 
September 1931, Japanese importers in Tianjin were quick 
to take advantage of the Customs’ diminished position in 
enforcing the levy of tariffs. The Baifu (百福) Company, 
Japanese-owned despite its Chinese name, advertised 
to Tianjin merchants by a printed circular notice in the 
following terms in 1936:
Don’t you aware [sic] that if you import your cargo 
through Chitung district via Dairen you can save 
three quarters on the import duty as compared with 
the Tientsin Maritime Customs? In other words, it 
means to save you considerably on the cost of goods, 
and, consequently, it will enable you to meet the 
competitive price of the market.28
24 SHAC 679/30609 Unsigned Memorandum, Confidential, dated 
Shanghai, October 23, 1933.
25 This refers to the Japanese army group based in the Japanese 
leased territory on the Liaodong Peninsula and along the South 
Manchuria Railway Zone.
26 Mr. D.J. Cowan (Tokyo) to Mr. Eden, May 4, 1936, Telegram, 
No.234 [F2548/991/10], BDFA Part II Series E Vol. 44, China, 
January 1936-June 1937.
27 SHAC 679/1/20385 L. de Luca to Maze, August 22, 1931, 
Tianjin No.9414.
28 SHAC 679/1/20833 W.R. Myers to Maze, December 12, 1936, 
Tianjin No.10762.
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Customs officials mostly viewed smuggling into the 
North China Plain in terms of Japan’s undeclared war 
against China. As B.E.F. Hall, responsible for the Chinese 
Maritime Customs’ anti-smuggling operations for a time in 
the 1930s, recalled later, “the Japanese were encouraging 
and giving protection to smugglers of every description 
and they were also running drugs into China to debilitate 
the country folk”.29 Japanese economic aggression needs 
to be put into its local context, however. As early as July 
1932, the Secretary of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce 
in Tianjin, Y. Kobayashi, wrote to the Commissioner of 
Customs in Tianjin to point out that “for three months or 
more, righteous importers of sugar [had] been suffering a 
heavy loss by unjust lower price [sic] in the market caused 
by smuggling on a large scale”.30 At the request of the 
Tianjin Commissioner of Customs, the Tianjin Japanese 
Chamber of Commerce also forwarded a copy of their 
correspondence to the authorities of the Guandong Leased 
Territory in an effort to enlist its support in suppressing 
smuggling by junks from the Guandong Leased Territory, 
in which the Customs Preventive Service was not allowed 
to function.31 In 1936, Japanese merchants in Tianjin 
again complained to their local consul about the influx 
of smuggled goods as damaging to legitimate Japanese 
commercial interests in China.  This demonstrates 
that the notion of a concerted Japanese onslaught on 
China in the 1930s needs to be modified. Japanese subjects 
were asking the Chinese state to defend its border against 
smugglers; even from the most cursory attention to a 
daily newspaper, they must have learnt that many of 
these smugglers were either Japanese, or Korean subjects 
of the Japanese colonial empire. And these were not just 
small firms; rather, the protests emanated from the Tianjin 
representative offices of Mitsui and Mitsubishi, two of the 
largest Japanese corporations.32 
By this time, smuggling into the North China Plain 
was no longer only a clandestine undertaking. Commodities 
to be smuggled were transported by boat, train or lorry 
from Japanese-controlled territory into the North China 
Plain. Under the Tang’gu (塘沽) Truce between China and 
Japan of 31st May 1933, large parts of North China became 
a demilitarized zone. While the Customs continued 
nominally to function within this area, Customs guards 
were forbidden by the collaborationist government and 
the Japanese occupation forces to function effectively, on 
the threat of being entirely evicted from North China, 
and faced the risk of confrontation with Japanese troops 
29 B.E.F. Hall, “My Life and Work in China, 1913-1943”, Hall 
Papers, Bristol University.
30 SHAC 679/1/20385, Japanese Chamber of Commerce to Com-
missioner of Customs, Tianjin, 5th July 1932, in L. de Luca to 
Maze, 14th July 1932, Tianjin No. 9599.
31 SHAC 679/1/20385 Japanese Chamber of Commerce to Com-
missioner of Customs, Tianjin, 13th July 1932, in L. de Luca to 
Maze, 14th July 1932, Tianjin No. 9599.
32 Haldore Hanson, “Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat”, Pacific 
Affairs 9/4 (1936), p.552.
in case they tried to assert their jurisdiction over Japanese 
smugglers.
Assessing the fiscal effect of smuggling into the 
North China Plain involves counterfactual scenarios and 
extrapolations based on reports of intercepted smuggled 
goods. The difference between the cost of smuggled and 
legally imported goods was considerable in the case of 
sugar. Hanson estimates that in 1935 the Tianjin price of 
smuggled sugar was about 40 percent of the price of legally 
imported sugar in Shanghai. Also according to Hanson, had 
all goods smuggled into the Tianjin region paid duty at the 
Tianjin Custom House, the weekly receipts of that Custom 
House would have been 2 million Chinese dollars or 104 
million dollars annually. The actual annual collection of 
the Tianjin Custom House in 1935 was 41 million Chinese 
dollars. In other words, through the addition of illegal 
trade, the value of goods traded in the Tianjin region 
tripled.33 This assumption is counterfactual since, had 
duty been levied on them, many of the smuggled goods 
would not have been imported since there would not have 
been the same incentive to import them had the cost of 
importation to the merchant been higher. However, this 
estimate shows the seriousness of smuggling in the North 
China Plain at this point.
factors InfluencInG chIna’s ImPort trade
Nationalist tariff policy was governed by the 
Government’s determination to raise the revenue 
necessary for successful public debt management. Because 
of this, it had an adverse impact on the consumption of 
imported goods. Various factors accounted for a long-term 
fall in the quantity and value of the importation of sugar 
and other imported goods such as kerosene, ammonium 
sulphate and cigarettes from 1928 until 1940. As one of 
the last countries in the world to retain a silver-based 
currency, which was only abolished in 1935, China was 
suffering from declining purchasing power abroad. Also, 
the ideology of both the New Life Movement, a GMD 
campaign, and of the National Goods Movement, a popular 
movement closely monitored, and often orchestrated by 
the GMD, emphasized the virtue of consuming domestic 
rather than foreign goods. Post-1931 figures lack the 
figures for goods imported into Manchuria, as these were 
not listed in Chinese trade returns after the Japanese 
annexation of Manchuria in 1931. Imports into the three 
north-eastern Manchurian provinces had accounted for 17 
percent of China’s import trade in 1931. 
Chinese import trade was also affected by 
international economic factors entirely outside the 
Nationalist Government’s control. A report on trade 
conditions in 1933 from the Tariff Secretary, Paul 
Barentzen, to the Inspector General summarizes theses 
factors: 
33 Hanson, “Soldier, Smuggler and Diplomat”, pp.545-546.
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Although the appended figures indicate considerably 
declining importations throughout the period of 3 
or 4 years, as the case may be, the cause does not 
altogether lie with the increased Tariff rates. The 
year 1929, as will be remembered, saw the Western 
countries at the height of a trade boom in which the 
market of this country, only just recovering from its 
own troubles and as yet on the fringe of advancing 
industrialism, did not participate to any great 
extent. But with the declining purchasing powers 
of the former through the year 1930, witnessing at 
the same time China’s growth of industrialism and 
increasing prosperity, attention was being drawn 
towards her markets as an outlet for surplus goods 
which could not be disposed of in the already 
overstocked markets of Europe and America. The 
year 1931 which witnessed the catastrophic slump 
in trade and finance in these countries should have 
found in the markets of China depository for such 
surplus stocks. That they did so in many lines of 
goods is evidenced by the fact that 1931 produced 
a record revenue which could not have been 
entirely been due to increased duties, but also to a 
genuine demand for goods from abroad, particularly 
throughout the sections of the Tariff where the rates 
had been retained at a low level for various reasons.34
With respect to the impact of economic nationalism 
on consumption, Frank Dikötter notes that “the majority 
of the working people may simply have ignored the 
movement for national goods” since “advantageous prices 
rather than economic nationalism were the key factors 
in substituting local equivalents for imported goods”. 
He concludes that “boycotts in particular, and economic 
nationalism in general, no doubt contributed to the 
price differentials between foreign and local goods, the 
introduction of higher import tariffs in 1931 being a good 
example, but long-term factors, such as a constant supply 
of cheap labour, labour-intensive manufacturing methods, 
and above all a willingness to adapt foreign designs closely 
to local purposes, were ultimately far more decisive”.35 
International economic factors were mostly beyond 
the Nationalist Government’s control. But increased 
import tariffs during a difficult economic climate were not. 
Demand for imported goods proved to be highly price-
elastic in all the examples studied; hence, increased tariffs 
led to a decline in the quantity and value of imports, and a 
shift of importation into illegal channels. In the first place, 
tariff incidence lay with retail merchants, who then passed 
it on to individual consumers. According to the Customs, 
it was common for importers to pass the duty on to retail 
merchants:
34 SHAC 679/31798 P.G.S. Barentzen, Tariff Secretary, to IG of 
Customs, S/O No 32, January 15, 1933. 
35 Frank Dikötter. Things Modern: Material Culture and Every-
day Life in China (London: Hurst, 2007): 43-44.
“by including in the sales contract a clause that duty 
is payable by the purchaser a wholesale importer of 
foreign goods into China is in a position to protect 
himself against a sudden and unexpected rise in the 
amount of duty, whether caused by a change in the 
tariff rate or an increase in the duty-paying value”.36 
In every published statement by GMD leaders about 
the aims of Nationalist tariff policy, these aims are stated 
as both increasing government revenue and promoting the 
growth of the national economy. The evidence surveyed 
indicates that of these two aims, increasing government 
revenue to finance expenditure and manage public debt 
was the more important one. 
conclusIon: tarIff PolIcy and natIonalIst PolIcy 
PrIorItIes
 
The relative degree of fiscal stability that resulted 
from the National Government’s fiscal policy choices cost 
it much political capital. When we think of Guomindang 
fiscal policy today, our view tends to be negative, shaped by 
memories of hyperinflation. We know that hyperinflation 
began in the latter years of the second Sino-Japanese War, 
and that its most acute phase—captured so vividly in Henri 
Cartier-Bresson’s famous photograph of a queue outside a 
bank in 1948—did not, in fact, take place until the Chinese 
Civil War of 1946-1949. The classic interpretations seek 
to show that Guomindang fiscal policy went wrong 
before the second Sino-Japanese War, and that the war 
only exacerbated existing problems in the fundamental 
approach of the Nationalist Government to fiscal policy. 
I have advanced my views as to the wartime origins and 
consequences of deficit financing elsewhere.37
Tracking the import trade in selected commodities, 
such as refined sugar in this article, allows us to analyze the 
effects of Guomindang tariff policy on Chinese consumers 
without losing sight of the fiscal and political pressures that 
the Nationalist Government confronted during this period. 
Ultimately, the National Government pursued fiscal 
stability at a time when it lacked the political and military 
strength to assert its authority throughout the entire area 
which it claimed to govern. Given this lack of authority, 
this pursuit had the negative side-effect of fostering the 
growth of an illegal economy, the well-known existence 
of which contributed much to the Guomindang’s loss of 
political capital.
36 SHAC 679/30470 IG of Customs Draft Despatch to Guanwu 
Shu, February 6, 1937, in Maze to Myers, February 9, 1937.
37 Felix Boecking. “Unmaking the Chinese Nationalist State: Ad-
ministrative Reform among Fiscal Collapse, 1937-1945.” Mod-
ern Asian Studies 45, no.2 (2011): 277-301.
